Uta Staiger
This text kinds a part of the report The Centre’s Final Probability? Classes from the 2025 German Elections from the UCL Coverage Lab and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). Learn the complete report right here for extra evaluation on outcomes and the teachings that may be realized for different centre-left and centre-right events in Europe, together with Britain.
To be conservative, in response to this most British of establishments, the Oxford English Dictionary, is to favour preserving, or conserving intact, an current construction or system: to be averse to elementary change.
The possible subsequent German Chancellor, chief of the German Christian Democratic Union Friedrich Merz, has a very conservative popularity. Distinctly to the political proper of his long-time rival, former Chancellor Angela Merkel, he’s additionally seen as a social conservative, be it within the space of household coverage and bioethics, or in discussions about German Leitkultur, its supposed core nationwide values.
And but, within the house of simply over a month, Merz has protagonised two of probably the most important political volte-faces within the 80 years for the reason that finish of World Struggle II. Instantly pre-election, he sponsored a invoice to tighten immigration coverage that breached the firewall – a previously unassailable normative place in German politics to not work with, or suggest any parliamentary motions that depend on the votes of, the acute proper. It didn’t stand him in good stead.
Instantly post-election, then, he went on to interrupt with one other, beforehand indeniable, tenet of the German political centre-right. Asserting, shortly after the polls closed, that the US not “care a lot in regards to the destiny of Europe”, he referred to as for speedy motion to strengthen Europe “in order that we obtain independence from the US”. A day later, he warned: “That is actually 5 minutes to midnight for Europe.”
These remarks discovered relatively extra approval, each domestically and Europe-wide. But they signify an unprecedented about-turn by one of the crucial explicitly Atlanticist German politicians of a few years, a former chairman of the influential Atlantik-Brücke, which has advocated for shut financial, monetary, instructional and navy partnership between Western Europe and the US for the reason that early Fifties.
“I by no means thought I’d say this”, Merz admitted. And never simply due to private convictions. Atlanticism has been within the DNA of German conservative politics for the reason that early post-war days. The primary Federal Chancellor, Christian Democrat Konrad Adenauer, recognised the US as ‘final arbiter’ in his efforts to combine the FRG as a newly sovereign and equal member in Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Certainly, Western European Christian Democrats, strongly supported by shut transatlantic networks, have been the architects of European integration within the early days. Within the face of Soviet threats, the US pushed for German rearmament; each advocated for the (finally doomed) European Defence Neighborhood. It is just within the context of a safety setting that’s altering radically and at blistering tempo, then, that Merz’ repositioning is even conceivable.
These stark geopolitical shifts give two new meanings to a different most British idea: the “squeezed center”. Domestically, first, centrist events really feel ever extra pressured by the return of a nativist politics that’s creating on each fringes of the political spectrum, if assembly on far-right grounds. Past the US, German simply as a lot because the French presidential and certainly the newest European parliament elections are a working example. It’s solely within the UK’s personal curiosity to hunt to counter the enchantment of populist events, that are so comfy with promising straightforward solutions to all troublesome questions – at residence and overseas. A state of affairs by which the AfD wins the subsequent German elections, Le Pen turns into President of France, and Reform UK take over from the Conservatives, is a high-risk one for democratic Europe, the UK included.
Second, geopolitically, Europe is now more and more hemmed in on (at the very least) two sides by globally dominant forces not favouring liberal democratic ideas. The US, so invested as soon as in European unity and functionality to face off the Soviet Union, now identifies Europe as an ideological risk, whereas siding with Russia. J.D. Vance’s feedback on the Munich Safety Convention clearly articulated this seismic shift in each normative and geopolitical phrases.
It exhibits that for all political ideologies, historical past can come calling. Lengthy-held assumptions and long-standing alliances can morph because the worldwide setting does. Merz, Atlanticist parexcellence, is now turning away from the US and towards a brand new European safety structure – the ‘strategic autonomy’ lengthy touted by French President Macron. Phrases would possibly even be adopted by – comparatively – swift motion, contemplating the normally sluggish tempo of German politics. It’s the one coverage space by which Merz’ possible coalition companions, the SPD, is most aligned; former defence minister Boris Pistorius (SPD), Germany’s hottest politician, might return to his function.
This may have an effect on European collaboration, not least within the safety and defence house. Along with a possible revived Franco-German relationship, and regardless that not a lot love is misplaced between Merz and the European Fee president, his party-political colleague and long-time Merkel ally Ursula von der Leyen, their place on the EU’s capacity to pursue its strategic pursuits globally might nicely align extra intently now.
It would subsequently be vital for the UK to watch the extent to which former MEP Merz is prepared or capable of take a extra outstanding management function in Europe than his predecessor – both approach, the UK will really feel the affect. However, with the very existence of NATO now being referred to as into doubt, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer will face troublesome strategic decisions about how he sees European-wide multilateral collaboration, together with and significantly in safety and defence issues, develop.
Thus far, he has been capable of win over governments on either side of the Atlantic.
Final October, the UK and Germany signed a landmark defence and safety settlement. In early February 2025, Starmer mentioned defence with EU heads of presidency over dinner in Brussels, the primary British PM to take action for the reason that UK left the bloc. Extra just lately, European leaders made the return journey to debate defence in London, forward of a particular European Council Assembly on the topic. It was a dramatic present of power in help of Ukraine, after President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s disastrous assembly within the White Home – and one which continues. As just lately as 15 March, Starmer hosted a Ukraine-focused name with counterparts from throughout Europe, EU Fee and Council, in addition to the NATO Secretary Common, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
But Starmer is unlikely ever to deploy such stark phrases as Merz. The federal government continues to interact intently with the US, not least over the proposed ceasefire take care of Russia. Certainly, the diplomatic overtures on show at his first go to to the White Home, and his liaison since, at present converse a diametrically opposed language – provides of a second state go to included.
The query shall be to what extent this, actually pivotal, function shall be open to Starmer as a strategic possibility in the long run, and never solely because of the demonstrated fickleness of Trump’s commerce and overseas coverage preferences. If that is certainly now the start of a Zeitenwende, by which the liberal post-war order is being referred to as into query, the federal government must confront more and more elementary political and normative decisions. One conservative tenet in any case is prone to information political leaders on either side of the Channel – the ambition to protect or preserve intact Europe, and its constitutional democracies.
Dr Uta Staiger is Affiliate Professor of European Research and Director of the UCL European Institute. Since 2010, she has led the Institute in its mission to develop and help UCL analysis and educating actions on Europe throughout colleges, advise UCL management on European issues, and maximise the attain and affect of UCL experience past the college. In 2017, she was appointed as Professional-Vice-Provost (Europe), a strategic place shaping UCL’s engagement with European greater schooling companions and coverage. On this function, she contributed to UCL’s Brexit mitigation planning and co-convened the college’s steering group on the research-based response to Brexit. She additionally labored on UCL’s institutional responses to the Russia-Ukraine battle. Uta is now UCL’s World Strategic Tutorial Advisor on Europe, working with the Vice-Provost for Analysis, Innovation and World Engagement.
Word: The views expressed on this submit are these of the writer, and never of the UCL European Institute, nor of UCL.
