On September 8, North Korea launched an undated picture of Kim Jong Un standing subsequent to an obvious road-mobile missile launcher (transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL) chassis that had no less than 12 axles, in comparison with the earlier 11-axle TEL of the massive, liquid-propellant Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Based mostly on the extra axle(s), it’s cheap to imagine the brand new TEL is longer than the Hwasong-17 TEL, and thus that the brand new chassis is related to an extended new ICBM or a space-launch automobile (SLV).
Nonetheless, the restricted info up to now doesn’t permit affirmation that the automobile within the picture is real, versus an engineering or propaganda mock-up, and supplies no stable foundation to affiliate it with a selected kind of ICBM or SLV. Assuming the brand new automobile is related to an ICBM or SLV, the primary prospects are:
Longer follow-ons to the solid-propellant Hwasong-18 or liquid Hwasong-17 ICBMs, of which the brand new picture could be the primary indication. The missiles’ longer levels (with or with out additionally having bigger diameters) would most likely be used to spice up heavier payloads, most certainly to extra simply accommodate a number of warheads.
A cellular launcher for the North’s newest “Chollima-1” SLV, which might enhance space-launch responsiveness and survivability, or use in transporting levels of the bigger SLV North Korea might be creating.
Use with an current ICBM system, which can’t be dominated out. For instance, utilizing extra axles on the Hwasong-17 TEL would additional distribute its substantial weight and cut back its floor strain, opening up the areas to which it may field-deploy whereas limiting the highway curves that such a automobile may traverse.
It stays to be seen whether or not the brand new automobile makes it out of the manufacturing unit and what ICBM or SLV system it might find yourself being related to. At a minimal, the brand new chassis signifies North Korea’s persevering with dedication to road-mobile missile deployment and additional suggests Pyongyang is ready to produce its personal TELs.
Data to Date
On September 8, the North Korean press reported an undated go to by Kim Jong Un to a “defence industrial enterprise.” Evaluation of the accompanying pictures signifies Kim visited the March 16 Manufacturing facility in Phyongsong, North Korea’s important manufacturing facility for road-mobile missile launchers (TELs), which Kim beforehand visited in January and Could of 2024.
One of many pictures confirmed Kim standing subsequent to an obvious TEL chassis with no less than 12 axles. The general size, width and variety of axles couldn’t be discerned, nevertheless. The highest of the automobile was not proven, no missile erector arms or different gear had been seen protruding above the automobile’s facet, and it was not carrying a missile, missile canister, or related cradles. As famous elsewhere, an obvious lifting arm (presumably meant to assist erect a missile) and different related options had been seen on the facet rear of the automobile that resemble these on the nine-axle TEL used for the Hwasong-18 solid-propellant ICBM.
What Might It Be?
The automobile’s format, inexperienced army paint job and presence at North Korea’s important TEL manufacturing facility all counsel the chassis is meant for use as the idea of a brand new kind of ballistic missile TEL. Based mostly on the automobile’s size as advised by the variety of axles, such a TEL would virtually actually be used with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or space-launch automobile (SLV) system. (The Hwasong-18 and the liquid-propellant Hwasong-15 ICBM use nine-axle TELs; the liquid-propellant Hwasong-17, North Korea’s largest ICBM, makes use of an 11-axle TEL.)
However the restricted info up to now doesn’t permit affirmation that the automobile within the picture is real, versus an engineering or propaganda mock-up, and supplies no stable foundation to affiliate it with a selected kind of ICBM or SLV. Assuming the automobile is related to an extant or developmental ICBM or SLV system, the 4 important prospects are mentioned beneath.
1) and a couple of) A Longer ICBM
Though the automobile’s total size and even whole variety of axles is unknown, it’s cheap to imagine the 12-plus-axle TEL is longer than the 11-axle Hwasong-11 TEL, and, thus that the brand new chassis could be related to an ICBM system longer than the Hwasong-11. If such a system is beneath growth, the picture launched by the North Koreans is the primary indication. Most likely the 2 important contenders for an extended ICBM could be:
A bigger solid-propellant ICBM. The similarities between the rear of the brand new TEL and that of the Hwasong-18 might point out there’s a follow-on to that ICBM utilizing longer booster levels. Longer levels of the present diameter could possibly be used to offer extra vary, however the present missile has already demonstrated the aptitude to hold its flight examined payloads (weight unknown) to about 15,000 kilometers (km), simply sufficient to succeed in anyplace within the continental United States. Subsequently, longer levels, with or with out a diameter improve, would extra probably be used to extend the quantity of payload the missile may ship to fifteen,000 km—a spread flagged by Kim Jong Un in January 2021. As a result of the brand new automobile’s width and total size are unknown, there is no such thing as a present foundation to determine whether or not any new system makes use of larger-diameter booster levels; nevertheless, diameter will increase would allow higher payload will increase than size will increase alone.
Any elevated payload would presumably be used to hold a number of warheads—if North Korea is assured that a number of reentry autos sufficiently small in diameter to suit on the brand new stable missile’s ultimate booster stage would survive reentry at operational ranges. Extra payload additionally could possibly be used to hold decoys and different ballistic missile penetration aids. Pyongyang claimed to have performed a flight on June 26 of a solid-propellant take a look at booster releasing three reentry autos and a decoy, though the take a look at apparently failed previous to precise payload launch.
An extended liquid-propellant ICBM. The similarities between the brand new TEL and the Hwasong-18 TEL don’t rule out use with an extended follow-on to the Hwasong-17 liquid ICBM. Such a missile additionally presumably would use longer levels (with or with out bigger diameters) to attain higher payload functionality at present ranges, because the present Hwasong-17 can also attain targets anyplace within the US with its flight examined payloads. As a result of the present missile already has a really massive payload functionality resulting from its massive measurement, the North would appear to have much less of a necessity for a bigger Hwasong-17 follow-on in comparison with a follow-on stable ICBM. However Pyongyang might have determined it wants an ICBM with much more payload capability than the Hwasong-17 with a purpose to carry a number of warheads massive and heavy sufficient to confidently survive reentry at operational ranges with out full-range flight testing—which the North has but to carry out and will want to proceed to keep away from for political or different causes. Extra payload weight additionally would allow extra or bigger decoys.
3) An SLV
Using the brand new chassis with an SLV can’t be dominated out. A cellular SLV launcher could possibly be enticing to North Korea by permitting launches away from mounted amenities, thus various launch and orbital places, probably rising response time, and bettering wartime survivability. The US and China, particularly, have been creating road-mobile SLV launchers for these causes.
North Korea’s newest SLV, the “Chollima-1,” makes use of a primary stage based mostly on the Hwasong-17 ICBM and is estimated to be about 29 meters lengthy, three to 4 meters longer than the ICBM. That elevated size may be suitable with the brand new, longer chassis. Though the inexperienced paint job of the brand new chassis would appear to counsel a army subordination, the North has to this point claimed the white-painted Chollima is beneath the civilian Nationwide Aerospace Expertise Administration (NATA). It could grow to be the case that some Chollimas will probably be managed by the army for cellular launch, NATA could use inexperienced TELs for its white missiles, or there might find yourself being each white/NATA and inexperienced/army cellular SLV launchers.
One other doable SLV-related use of the brand new chassis could be as a stage transporter for the bigger SLV North Korea is outwardly creating, as advised by actions at its Sohae Satellite tv for pc Launching Floor since 2022. Relying on the scale of the brand new SLV, the brand new chassis could possibly be helpful in transferring its first stage, particularly, round and between manufacturing, ultimate meeting and launch amenities.
4) A present ICBM
Though an extended TEL intuitively suggests an extended missile, it’s doable that the brand new TEL is related to an current ICBM system. In that case, one of the best candidate would most likely be the massive Hwasong-17 liquid missile, the place the addition of a number of axles would additional distribute its 100,000-150,000 kg weight and cut back the bottom strain exerted when utilizing its current 11-axle TEL. Use of an extended TEL may thus open up extra roadways and off-road places to assist higher transfer and conceal field-deployed Hwasong-17 items, however would additionally restrict the highway curves that such a automobile may traverse.
Outlook
It stays to be seen whether or not the brand new automobile makes it out of the manufacturing unit, and what ICBM or SLV system it might find yourself being related to. But when it’s a “new-type” system, there will probably be loads of time to evaluate that system as soon as it begins flight testing. At a minimal, the brand new chassis signifies North Korea’s persevering with dedication to road-mobile missile deployment and additional suggests Pyongyang is ready to produce its personal TELs.
