Do Individuals and South Koreans anticipate the US to defend South Korea towards a North Korean invasion? My unique survey knowledge finds almost 1 / 4 of Individuals consider the US would do nothing, whereas South Koreans are extra assured that the US will at the least provide weapons and intelligence to the South. Extra stunning, multiple in twenty Individuals and one in ten Koreans surveyed supported the US utilizing nuclear weapons on this state of affairs. The outcomes spotlight challenges in addressing expectations and lift considerations about public understanding of the results of a US response.
President Trump is anticipated to demand increased army value shares from South Korea and Japan, elevating questions on whether or not both ally is keen to pay extra and if not, how may US protection commitments change. In South Korea, this was a significant level of rivalry throughout Trump’s first time period. The South Korean public largely opposed Trump’s earlier $5 billion enhance demand, even whereas supporting the alliance extra broadly. However given the continued antagonism over burden sharing, Trump’s earlier threats to withdraw US troops from the Korean Peninsula, and even his remedy of different allies, it stays unclear whether or not the US and South Korean public actually consider the US will nonetheless defend South Korea in case of a North Korean assault.
The Prices of Battle
Estimating even short-term casualties of such an invasion is difficult given the capabilities of each side, the anticipated assist of the US and maybe others, and the bodily proximity of the demilitarized zone to Seoul. North Korea’s assortment of missiles, rocket launchers, and long-range artillery, extra broadly, should still inflict mass casualties to the densely-populated Seoul even when South Korea was in a position to thwart efforts by counter-artillery and missile protection techniques. A US-backed South Korea would preserve a number of benefits in the long term in such a battle, particularly air superiority, however this is able to not negate the preliminary challenges and the potential for city warfare and mass panic. One estimate assumed prices of as much as $20 billion {dollars} for the US and $2.5 billion for China. A 2017 Pentagon simulation anticipated 20,000 deaths each day in South Korea, whereas the US Division of Protection estimated 200,000-300,000 South Korean and US army casualties within the first 90 days. A struggle may additionally incur $40 trillion in property injury, with a possible decline of three.9% of worldwide GDP within the first 12 months.
Such eventualities additionally sometimes assume that an preliminary invasion doesn’t embody North Korea’s use of weapons of mass destruction, regardless of the idea that the nation possesses each organic and chemical weapons alongside a small stockpile of nuclear warheads and Kim Jong Un’s personal statements about increasing the nation’s variety of warheads and that the weapons are usually not purely defensive. South Korea’s elevated curiosity in their very own nuclear capabilities or the redeployment of American nuclear weapons additional complicates estimates. The endurance of an off-the-cuff nuclear taboo now turns into harder to proceed in an period of higher worldwide uncertainty.
Public Perceptions
Earlier analysis provides some indication of public expectations. A 2024 Chicago Council survey finds a majority of Individuals throughout events assist sustaining US army bases in South Korea, with different surveys discovering tepid assist for closing bases and customarily a supportive public for bases. Nonetheless, the US public more and more seems disinterested in an lively overseas coverage, preferring an inward-looking coverage according to President Trump’s “America First” marketing campaign rhetoric. In the meantime, South Koreans seem typically supportive of the US army presence, and views of Trump’s value calls for didn’t appear to affect this assist. A historical past of assist for South Korea’s protection nonetheless doesn’t guarantee future assist, and because the deterioration of US relations with Canada attests, modifications could also be abrupt.
To deal with perceptions of what the US would do for South Korea’s protection, I performed two nationwide net surveys, utilizing quota sampling for age, gender, and area. The primary, performed from February 12-26 by way of the corporate Centiment, surveyed 522 Individuals. The second, performed from February 24-27 by Macromill Embrain, surveyed 1,000 South Koreans. The surveys didn’t explicitly remind respondents that the US maintains a army presence of over 28,500 personnel in South Korea. Whereas this can be seen as frequent information to Korea-watchers, it might not be, significantly to a phase of the US inhabitants disinterested in worldwide affairs, and thus exclusion of this info upfront could higher present a baseline view of beliefs of what the US ideally ought to do.
Beginning with the US, almost 1 / 4 of respondents (24.33%) anticipated the US to do nothing, whereas the commonest response was to produce assist and intelligence (49.43%), with 37.36% considering the US ought to commit troops and air assist. This means maybe ignorance of the present presence of US personnel in-country, a perception that extra commitments wouldn’t be warranted, or sensitivity to potential casualties. Maybe most alarming was that 12.84% of respondents supported using tactical nuclear weapons. At first look, this means a stark willingness to interrupt the nuclear taboo that has held for the reason that finish of World Struggle II, however one other interpretation could also be that this existential menace to South Korea would require such a major response. Furthermore, we see restricted variations between Democrats and Republicans, suggesting that, regardless of an more and more polarized view of overseas coverage, and a majority of respondents (60.54%) stating the “we must always pay much less consideration to issues abroad and focus on issues at house,” this doesn’t translate to how to answer North Korea.
Shifting to the South Korean knowledge, we see a number of variations. First, South Koreans general had been far much less more likely to consider the US would do nothing (7.10%), maybe because of being cognizant of the US army presence already within the nation. This will additionally clarify the agency perception that the US would provide assist and intelligence. Concerning expectations of the US committing troops and air assist, general charges are solely barely increased than these within the US (41.3% vs. 37.36%), maybe suggesting a hesitation that the US would commit extra sources if conventional efforts at deterrence had failed. Of specific observe, South Koreans had been much more expectant that the US would use tactical nuclear weapons, 21.2% of respondents general. We additionally see extra of a partisan distinction right here between the liberal Democratic Get together (DP) and the conservative Folks Energy Get together (PPP), with the PPP much less more likely to consider the US would offer assist and help, however extra more likely to commit troops or use nuclear weapons.
Conclusion
Public opinion doesn’t dictate overseas coverage choices, however it will possibly form leaders’ choices and supply justification for actions taken. The findings right here reveal a notable hole: South Koreans present higher confidence that the US will reply if North Korea invaded the South, together with the opportunity of utilizing nuclear weapons, whereas US respondents had been over thrice extra more likely to consider the US would do nothing on this state of affairs.
Whereas each publics acknowledge the gravity of the state of affairs, the outcomes level to considerations that overconfidence in South Korea could drive expectations, limiting consideration of a US that fails to reply sufficiently. Admittedly, capturing public opinion a couple of hypothetical is marred with “what ifs,” particularly the place the tip consequence could result in a battle of the magnitude not seen within the area in a long time, including uncertainty to produce chains. Public views about battle naturally change as soon as battle strikes from the summary to the concrete.
For the US, addressing the differing expectations of each populations may inform extra strategic communications about its function in defending South Korea and enhance general reassurance even amid ongoing disputes inside the alliance over such points as army burden sharing. Moreover, the obvious willingness to make use of tactical nuclear weapons warrants broader consideration as to what sort of results it could have on the Korean Peninsula and whether or not the general public absolutely conceptualizes what breaking this taboo may imply for future battle.
