Local government: Council ‘zealous to a fault’ over contempt

Civil contempt arises (amongst different issues) when a celebration to proceedings breaches a judgment or order in opposition to it or fails to chorus from doing a selected act. Beneath Civil Process Rule 81.9: ‘If the court docket finds the defendant in contempt of court docket, the court docket could impose a interval of imprisonment (an order of committal), a wonderful, confiscation of belongings or different punishment permitted below the legislation.’

Nonetheless, (per Halsbury’s Legal guidelines of England (Halsbury), quantity 24 at paragraph 72): ‘The facility to order committal for civil contempt is an influence to be exercised with nice care. The court docket will solely punish disobedience to an order of the court docket, or non-compliance with an endeavor, if glad that the phrases of the order or endeavor are clear and unambiguous, that the defendant has correct discover of the phrases and {that a} breach of the order or endeavor has been proved past affordable doubt.’ On 19 August 2024, Kerr J thought of this problem in giving judgment in London Borough of Richmond v Trotman [2024] EWHC 2145.

The defendant, Mr Trotman, used to function riverboats on the River Thames. When his actions turned unwelcome to the boroughs of Kingston and Richmond, which personal and handle the riverbank, Richmond introduced contempt proceedings alleging breaches of an injunction granted by Lambert J in July 2023 which included an influence of arrest. Richmond contended that Trotman’s positioning of his boat from 18 July to 25 September 2023 and his attaching it to the riverbed on or close to Richmond’s land breached the injunction.

Lambert J’s order was subsequently changed in November 2023 with a special order based on nuisance, not trespass in accordance with a reserved judgment given by His Honour Decide Blair KC who granted an injunction to cease the nuisance, expiring in July 2028. Whereas, by then, Richmond had already issued the moment contempt utility, earlier than Kerr J Richmond ‘belatedly’ accepted that the council was sure by the related findings and selections of HHJ Blair KC below the doctrine of problem estoppel (the place a selected problem has already been litigated and determined). Richmond submitted that since Trotman was responsible of contempt to the prison customary of proof in his breach of Lambert J’s order (which was not in power), and since he had no belongings of substance, the suitable penalty was a time period of imprisonment suspended for 2 years provided that he doesn’t breach HHJ Blair KC’s order.

Kerr J famous the above passage from Halsbury, and in addition highlighted Halsbury quantity 24 at paragraph 110 which signifies that the court docket ‘is not going to order committal the place the contempt is of a minor or technical nature’. He discovered it unlikely that Lambert J ‘can have meant to ban acts that (i) as in opposition to Richmond, didn’t quantity to trespass; (ii) amounted, or could have amounted solely to nuisance, a reason for motion she didn’t take into account; and (iii) amounted to some type of “mooring” exterior the byelaw definition of that time period.’ Relating to two of the allegations in opposition to Trotman, on 18 July he was unable to begin the tug engine wanted to take away his boat, so had with issue to haul it some 60 yards downstream.  It was, famous Kerr J, ‘on the most a shortlived trespass akin to what HHJ Blair KC later known as (writing a few totally different event) “one thing of a contrivance… to attempt to discovered a tenuous foundation for a reason for motion in trespass”’.  And, though opposite to the order of Lambert J, ‘It might not have persuaded HHJ Blair KC to grant a closing injunction’. So, indicated Kerr J, ‘the one breach proved is minor’ and ‘inadequate to discovered an order of committal’. He was subsequently ‘unwilling to make one primarily based on it’.

However, the court docket additionally expressed ‘numerous severe issues about the best way during which these contempt proceedings have been pursued’. For: ‘A statesmanlike and sensible choice would have been to desert them after HHJ Blair KC’s judgment and order. He made binding findings significantly lowering the sting of any contempt. His order changed Lambert J’s with one that may be a mannequin of readability. He excoriated the drafting of Lambert J’s order, with good purpose. He forged severe doubt on the ability of arrest.’ Kerr J subsequently thought of that ‘continuation of the contempt proceedings after these setbacks was ill-judged’.

In abstract, stated Kerr J, ‘Richmond’s pursuit of Mr Trotman in these contempt proceedings has been zealous to a fault, to the purpose of being heavy handed, even extending to the loud and harsh tone during which Mr Trotman was, at instances, cross-examined, with discursive and aggressive questioning. Richmond’s misplaced zeal in its pursuit of him was in inverse proportion to the dwindling deserves of its case in opposition to him in contempt. It has been neglectful of its duties to its unrepresented opponent and to the court docket to tell each of factors that would help the opposite facet.’ Alternatively, Trotman was not with out fault. For ‘it shouldn’t be forgotten that Mr Trotman has dedicated an ongoing and persevering with public nuisance over months and doubtless years by blocking the river financial institution and impeding the lawful train of navigation and mooring rights of others’. And he ‘is a tough character with an abrasive and generally (not all the time) discourteous method’. Within the circumstances, the appliance for a committal order was dismissed and the order of HHJ Blair KC will proceed till it expires at midnight on 29 July 2028.

Nicholas Dobson writes on native authorities, public legislation and governance