Final December, the Worldwide Atomic Power Company (IAEA) assessed that “the considerably elevated manufacturing and accumulation of excessive enriched uranium by Iran, the one non-nuclear weapon state to provide such nuclear materials, is of significant concern” for the worldwide group. Moreover, the US intelligence group’s 2025 Annual Risk Evaluation mentioned Iran “isn’t constructing a nuclear weapon and that Supreme Chief Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, although stress has most likely constructed on him to take action.” Whereas successive US presidential administrations have warned Iran won’t ever be allowed to accumulate a nuclear weapon, the menace is assuming better urgency and calls for fast motion.
The Iran Problem
After issuing a February 2025 Nationwide Safety Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) restoring “most stress on the federal government of the Islamic Republic of Iran” and accompanied by a contemporary spherical of financial sanctions focusing on its ‘oil community,’ President Donald Trump supplied Tehran a political and financial lifeline. In March, he despatched a letter to Mr. Khamenei proposing negotiations over its nuclear program and establishing a 60-day compliance deadline, or the administration would discover “different methods to resolve the dispute.” To underscore the latter, the US deployed B-2 stealth bombers to the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia as an unmistakable message to Iran.
This aggressive ‘carrot and stick’ strategy is per Mr. Trump’s inclination to drive a tough discount. In a latest televised interview, he defined, “I’d slightly negotiate a deal. I’m unsure that everyone agrees with me, however we will make a deal that may be simply pretty much as good as should you gained militarily.” He additionally expressed hope that Iran can be keen to barter “as a result of if we’ve got to go in militarily, it’s going to be a horrible factor.”
Iran initially rebuffed the US provide and decried the efforts of (unnamed) “bullying governments” to impose new and unacceptable calls for however subsequently agreed to take part in ‘oblique talks.’ What explains Tehran’s abrupt change in place?
Coming to the Desk
One want look no additional than Iran’s dire financial situations, which embody a foreign money collapse, rising unemployment, and sky-high inflation ensuing within the impeachment and removing of the economic system minister from workplace. Seeing a possible financial alternative, the ‘reasonable’ Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with the Supreme Chief who “has no opposition to American traders within the nation. “Allow them to come and make investments.” Sanctions are as soon as once more driving Iran to the negotiating desk, harking back to occasions resulting in the 2015 Joint Complete Plan of Motion (JCPOA).
What’s completely different immediately is the Trump administration’s capability to use Iran’s weakened geopolitical place. The October 7, 2023 Hamas assault towards Israel has confirmed a strategic blunder for Tehran, leading to vital degradation of its proxy forces—the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’—and diminished affect within the area. For instance, Hamas has been decimated and noticed its chief, Yahya Sinwar, killed by Israeli Protection Forces (IDF) final fall. Moreover, the human struggling of the Palestinian folks (ad infinitum) sparked protests calling for the group to step apart. In the meantime, Hezbollah is reeling from IDF airstrikes that killed Hassan Nasrallah and chronic floor operations in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, the ouster of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad impedes Iran’s capability to offer navy and logical assist to Hezbollah, along with shedding its ‘land hall’ to the Mediterranean Sea. Lastly, the US navy is conducting relentless airstrikes in Yemen to degrade the Houthis’ capability to disrupt world maritime visitors and preserve freedom of navigation within the Crimson Sea.
Extra instantly, IDF airstrikes have considerably broken Iran’s air defenses and left its important infrastructure weak to future assaults whereas inflicting “deep alarm” in Tehran. The aerial assaults occurred after IDF and allied defenses efficiently intercepted 99% of the greater than 300 Iranian missiles and drones launched at Israel.
Preserving a Legacy
Contemplating Iran’s grim state of affairs, it’s unsurprising that Mr. Khamenei is keen to pursue negotiations to protect the regime and safe his legacy. As an 86-year-old most cancers survivor, he’s keenly conscious of his mortality and the urgency of building a viable succession plan. A profitable nuclear deal would purchase precious time to stabilize the nation and its economic system.
The Trump administration would additionally profit from a diplomatic ‘win,’ given its restricted progress in resolving different overseas coverage issues. For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intransigence makes the chance of Ukraine warfare peace talks producing a profitable consequence a distant risk. In the meantime, efforts to resolve the Gaza warfare and return hostages captured by Hamas seem stalled, and Israel has resumed navy floor operations amidst a rising humanitarian disaster. These vexing issues are exacerbated by the worldwide financial uncertainty surrounding US tariffs and a brewing commerce warfare with China.
In keeping with information experiences and different accounts, the preliminary (oblique) talks in Oman went as anticipated, with each side describing the assembly as “constructive.” As an extra signal of progress, US Center East envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian International Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke for round 45 minutes and future negotiations are scheduled to chart a path ahead.
Can Trump Forge the Nuclear Deal?
Mr. Trump might use these negotiations to deal with his longstanding grievance that the JCPOA “was one of many worst and most one-sided transactions the USA has ever entered into” and failed to deal with Iran’s missile program whereas offering the regime with funding for its “terrorist proxies.” Nevertheless, each side are conscious of the expiration of the JCPOA in October and the looming risk of the United Nations imposing ‘snapback sanctions’ that may complicate (if not terminate) future negotiations.
The JCPOA took some 20 months of detailed and intense negotiations, and the abbreviated timeline argues towards the Trump administration’s pursuit of some type of ‘grand discount’ with all stakeholders. This urgency to energy the deal may clarify why Europe has been sidelined from the talks regardless that the so-called ‘E3’ (Britain, France, and Germany) might set off the snapback mechanism by the tip of June.
As an alternative, present circumstances argue for utilizing the 2015 Iran nuclear deal as a framework whereas making some much-needed modifications. For instance, the US ought to insist on extra sturdy and stringent monitoring of Iran’s nuclear websites, figuring out the suitable disposition of present uranium stockpiles, and abolishing the so-called ‘sundown clause’ that phased out uranium enrichment limitations and permits Tehran to pursue nuclear weapons sooner or later. Along with sanctions reduction, the Trump administration might provide to submit a ultimate settlement to the US Senate for ratification to assuage Iran’s considerations about Washington’s enduring dedication to the nuclear accord.
Whereas a JCPOA 2.0 won’t be satisfying to Iran hawks and critics that favor a ‘larger, higher deal,’ the choice is the usage of navy power to destroy Iran’s nuclear amenities that can additional elevate tensions and threat US involvement in one other main warfare within the Center East. As an alternative, brokering a nuclear take care of Iran would improve Mr. Trump’s diplomatic credibility and supply momentum to pursue different US pursuits within the area, reminiscent of increasing the Abraham Accords, a signature overseas coverage achievement in his first time period.
The stakes are excessive, however the potential reward is nice.
In regards to the Writer:
Jim Prepare dinner is a Professor of Nationwide Safety Affairs on the U.S. Naval Conflict School. The views expressed listed below are solely these of the writer alone and don’t essentially characterize the views, insurance policies, or positions of the US Division of Protection or its elements, together with the Division of the Navy or the U.S. Naval Conflict School.
