In any high-intensity warfare with North Korea, South Korea and the USA will closely depend on air strikes to assault key North Korean places and belongings. Although the dense community of air protection techniques in North Korea offers overlapping and redundant protection of the nation at medium and excessive altitudes, the effectiveness of those techniques has drastically diminished within the face of evolving air threats, leaving the nation weak to air strikes to the extent targets could be situated.[1] Nevertheless, North Korea has been making efforts to attempt to cut back this vulnerability, and a few technical breakthroughs for upgrading its air protection capabilities is likely to be close to at hand.[2] A modernized air protection community couldn’t solely higher shield strategic places, but in addition present cowl for the operations of North Korean troops, particularly the nuclear forces.
Mid- and Lengthy-range Air Protection Programs
In a high-intensity warfare situation, South Korea, the USA and presumably Japan may launch a variety of precision land-attack munitions in opposition to North Korea from air, land and sea. These munitions primarily embody:
Tactical ballistic missiles and presumably hypersonic missiles in a couple of years
Subsonic land-attack cruise missiles
Loitering munitions and suicide drones
Guided bombs and different precision munitions
Contemplating cost-effectiveness, and because of a restricted radar line of sight at low altitudes, particularly in mountainous terrains, mid- and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are higher suited to interact manned plane, medium and huge drones, and, when doable, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles.
In North Korea, out of date Soviet-era SAMs stay the spine of ground-based, mid- and long-range air protection techniques. These gear may solely pose very restricted threats to US and South Korean air belongings. As could be seen in Figures 1 and a couple of, the Soviet S-75 (SA-2) has been essentially the most quite a few SAM in North Korea. In keeping with open-source analysis, North Korea was additionally in a position to produce its personal S-75 missiles with Chinese language help.
[3]

Legacy Programs Improve
Each the S-75 (SA-2) and S-125 (SA-3) are guided by radio command. Beneath this steering mode, the missile is steered through radio command from a ground-based engagement radar, which tracks each the missile and its goal.[4] Judging from restricted footage launched by state media, North Korea has added an infrared seeker to no less than a few of its S-75 missiles.[5] This modification would result in three enhancements:
A terminal infrared seeker may enhance accuracy, particularly at longer vary, because the accuracy of radio command steering decreases when the missile flies farther from its ground-based engagement radar.
A change of steering mode throughout flight may, in principle, improve difficulties for ECM (digital countermeasures).
As quickly because the infrared seeker locks onto goal, the ground-based radar may select to disengage, which can barely enhance operational flexibility and survivability of the radar.
As well as, North Korea has additionally tried to mount S-75 launchers on tracked and wheeled road-mobile platforms, even if the S-75 is a comparatively cumbersome, liquid-propellant missile (with a strong booster). The buildup of those upgrades led to a singular North Korean S-75 system outfitted with infrared seekers and carried by cell launchers. This modification was first unveiled on the Exhibition Home of Navy {Hardware} of the Korean Folks’s Military (KPA) in 2012 (Determine 3).

With improved mobility, accuracy and ECCM (counter-electronic countermeasures) capabilities, the upgraded S-75 techniques may pose a modest menace to US and South Korean plane—though this classic system is properly understood by the alliance, which presumably has deployed varied countermeasures in opposition to it. If and to what extent these modifications have been adopted by the KPA stays unconfirmed within the open-source area, although some have claimed that there’s a “widespread introduction” of infrared seekers amongst present S-75 missiles deployed at mounted websites.[6] In the meantime, North Korea’s efforts to improve the S-125 system seems to have been restricted to solely enchancment in mobility, which presumably is a perform of fewer accessible S-125 items.
Programs Beneath Improvement
번개 5 (Pongae-5/Lightning-5/KN-06)
North Korea revealed a brand new solid-propellant SAM known as the Lightning-5 (US designation KN-06) throughout a army parade in October 2010. Key parts of the Lightning-5 seem like much like that of the Russian S-300 (SA-10) long-range SAM (Determine 4), and are mounted on wheeled automobiles.

South Korean authorities don’t commonly report on North Korean SAM actions. However, in line with media reviews, the North might need check fired the Lightning-5 in Might 2009[7] and June 2011. In a January 2015 KCTV documentary, an engagement radar of the Lightning-5 was seen taking part in a joint reside fireplace drill (Determine 5).

North Korean state media publicly reported on the check launch of the Lightning-5 in April 2016[8] and Might 2017. In keeping with South Korean authorities, a Lightning-5 missile within the April 2016 check reached a variety of round 100 km. Contemplating that pure radio command steering would restrict the vary of a SAM to round 70 km,[9] the Lightning-5 possible adopted a extra subtle steering mode.[10]
Total, the Lightning-5 in all probability represents substantial enhancements in mobility, vary and multi-target engagement capabilities compared to the S-75, S-125 and S-200 legacy SAMs at present in service with the KPA.[11] Throughout the Might 2017 check, Kim Jong Un acknowledged that the Lightning-5 “must be mass-produced to deploy in everywhere in the nation like forests.” Nevertheless, regardless of Kim’s order, there is no such thing as a substantial proof within the open-source area suggesting that the Lightning-5 has been deployed in any important numbers or that it has ever entered energetic service.
There may very well be quite a few explanations for the Lightning-5’s obvious lack of progress after 2017, reminiscent of technological flaws, high quality points, incapability to provoke mass manufacturing or constraints in assets and funds. The looks of one other new-type SAM in 2020, nevertheless, indicated that North Korea might need determined to halt the event of Lightning-5 in favor of an much more bold venture.
별찌-1-2 (Pyoljji-1-2/Meteor-1-2)
Throughout a parade in October 2020, one other sort of long-range solid-propellant road-mobile SAM was placed on show. North Korea subsequently claimed that this new SAM was examined in September 2021, November 2022, February 2024 and April 2024. Throughout the April 2024 check, the SAM was referred to by state media as Meteor-1-2.
To fulfill totally different vary necessities, the Meteor-1-2 could be placed on both a brief booster or an extended one.[12] After booster burnout, the Meteor-1-2 is then powered by a sustainer motor.[13] Notably, the missile seems to have two units of aerodynamic management surfaces (eight management surfaces in complete, referred to by the KCNA as twin-rudder management expertise) and 4 mounted wings to offer stability and extra carry. This reasonably unconventional design is paying homage to Israel’s Stunner missile (Determine 6) and, to a lesser extent, Japan’s Kind 03 Chū-SAM.[14]

Contemplating its total structure, the Meteor-1-2 may, in principle, have an extended vary and better maneuverability than the Lightning-5 as a result of:
A two-stage rocket may allow the missile to fly additional than a single-stage rocket of comparable dimension;
After booster burnout, the missile turns into significantly smaller and lighter than the Lightning-5; and
It’s steered by eight movable fins as an alternative of 4.
This comparability appears to assist the maneuverability and vary features of state media’s declare that the Meteor-1-2 options “fast responsiveness and steering accuracy of missile management system in addition to the substantial improve within the distance of downing air targets.”
In keeping with photos launched by state media, the engagement radar of the Meteor-1-2 additionally seems to be totally different from that of the Lightning-5. Most notably, the absence of the feedhorn behind the phased array antenna (Determine 7) signifies that additional modifications have been made to the Meteor-1-2’s radar.[15]

It’s doable that each the Lighting-5 and Meteor-1 techniques are speculated to obtain goal data from the identical new-type goal acquisition radar and new-type early warning radar North Korea unveiled in 2021, which may function essential parts in North Korea’s future air surveillance community. Nevertheless, there is no such thing as a up to date data relating to these radars at this level.[16]
Quick-range Air Protection Programs
Quick-range air protection techniques are primarily meant to conduct close-in intercepts of low-altitude cruise missiles, loitering munitions, suicide drones, glide bombs and different precision munitions launched from plane, in addition to manned plane inside their attain. The continued warfare in Ukraine as soon as once more clearly demonstrated the need for short-range protection techniques to assist counter these air threats.
North Korea has produced and deployed comparatively trendy man-portable air protection techniques (MANPADS) which can be meant to interact each plane and small, low-altitude targets reminiscent of cruise missiles[17] and numerous towed and self-propelled anti-aircraft weapons.[18] As well as, the nation additionally operates quite a few Soviet 9K35 (SA-13) cell short-range SAMs. In keeping with at present accessible open-source data, nevertheless, most of those techniques lack efficient means for goal acquisition and fireplace management by trendy requirements (Determine 8).[19]

Improve Potentials
Probably the most complete short-range air protection suite in North Korea up to now may very well be discovered onboard a brand new class of naval corvettes that was revealed by state media in August 2023. The corvette, known as the Amnok class by the surface world, incorporates a short-range, low-altitude search radar, electro-optical sensors, Gatling weapons and a MANPADS launcher (Determine 9). In contrast with floor combatants of developed navies, the Amnok class solely has very fundamental close-in self-defense capabilities. Nevertheless, the sensors on board, particularly the low-altitude search radar and electro-optical sensors,[20] may, in principle,[21] even be integrated into land-based techniques to extend the effectiveness of the North’s short-range air protection belongings.[22]

Programs Beneath Improvement
North Korea showcased its most bold short-range SAM venture throughout a army parade in October 2020. In idea, this new SAM shares a detailed resemblance to the Russian Tor (SA-15) and Chinese language HQ-17 techniques. Similar because the Tor and the HQ-17, the new-type SAM seems to have adopted the easy radio-command steering mode, however ought to have the ability to interact a couple of goal concurrently due to the introduction of an electronically scanned array engagement radar.
It’s unclear what number of missiles the North Korean model is designed to hold per automobile. For reference, the Tor M2 variant carries as much as 16 vertical launch tubes (Determine 10), whereas older sorts and the Chinese language HQ-17 carry as much as eight tubes. The utmost vary of a Tor missile is about 12 km, tripling that of typical MANPADS.

If deployed in giant numbers, this new-type SAM ought to, in principle, considerably strengthen air protection at short-range and at low-to-medium altitude,[23] though the Tor system in Ukraine seems to have proven a blended efficiency.[24] Up to now, North Korea has not reported any check fireplace and the way forward for this SAM venture stays opaque. As well as, in 2021, North Korea additionally displayed air-to-air missiles with trendy aerodynamic layouts in an arms exhibition. These air-to-air missiles, if efficiently developed, may very well be transformed into short-range SAMs with out main modifications.
Conclusion
Efforts made up to now 20 years have yielded few ends in enhancing North Korea’s outdated air protection capabilities, leaving the North’s typical and nuclear capabilities weak to strikes from the air. Alternatively, North Korea seems to be near attaining extra succesful anti-air belongings. Nevertheless, it stays unclear how lengthy it might take the North to improve its legacy air protection community throughout the nation, and the extent to which such upgrades would hold tempo with evolving aerial threats.